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1 Introduction
Despite the increasing economic signicance of the sports industry,1 the literature on
the economics of sport kicked o¤ by Rottenberg (1956) continues to be behind
the curve. While there is a generally accepted overall view of the peculiarities of the
labor market in this industry nicely crystallized by Rosen and Sanderson (2001)
, less headway has been made in formal theoretical analysis that not only explains
the empirical observations, but can provide insights that are transferable to other
industries with oligopolistic competition in both input and output markets.2 In this
paper we take a step in that direction, putting forward a set of original modelling
choices, which together form a basic microstructure of the labor market in sport.
This framework is amenable to being built upon with the introduction of further
institutional details.
We start our journey positing a state-of-the-art3 form for the clubsobjective
functions, unifying pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives. The novelty in our for-
mulation is to provide micro-foundations for how the trade-o¤ between utility and
money can be endogenously derived, implying the absence of a budget constraint.
Our fundamental observation is that both benefactors and supporter-owned clubs
have alternative uses for money that also provide them with utility. A magnate
might wish to buy a yacht, a membersclub might want to subsidize its other ac-
tivities/teams. This fact implies that rather than an inexible (budget) constraint,
what the club has to factor into its decision is the shadow utility or opportunity
cost of the money spent on the team, captured by the slope of the clubs indirect
utility function. As a result, we can postulate a general objective function, incorpo-
1For example, according to Sport England: In 2010, sport and sport-related activity generated
Gross Value Added (GVA) of £ 20.3 billion ($30 billion) 1.9% of the England total. This placed
sport within the top 15 industry sectors in England and larger than sale and repair of motor vehicles,
insurance, telecoms services, legal services and accounting.And this is before taking into account
the savings in health care costs, estimated at $16 billion. See also Bryson et al. (2015).
2As an example, our model of the player market could be adapted to the market for CEOs, and
contribute to an explanation of why they are overpaid.
3For an excellent survey of club objective functions, see Fort (2015). Madden (2015b) (referred
to as Madden (forthcoming)by Fort) is the closest to our formulation.
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rating both prot and/or non-prot criteria, and still use the rst-order approach.
Next, we turn to our main contribution, the modelling of the player market. A
crucial question in setting up a game-theoretic model for this is what the clubs
choice variable should be. We claim that it is unhelpful to think of the amount of
talent hired as the (strategic) decision of a club.4 While payo¤s are determined by
the nal distribution of talent, it is clear that neither empirically nor theoretically 
just think of the constrained supply case is it credible that clubs can unilaterally
decide the amount of talent they hire.5 It is their strategic interaction in the player
market that leads to the nal talent allocation, so we need to model that market
with care.
In order to develop a viable microstructure, we note that an essential character-
istic of sport is that the clubs are interacting in two di¤erent markets. Not only are
they competing for the players, but they are also engaged in a tournament and, in
fact, in joint production on the eld/pitch/court. As a result, the willingness to
pay of a club for an additional player depends on where this player would go if she
were not hired by the club.6 Moreover, the fundamental issue is that clubs would
like to and, in practice, do a¤ect whether or not they are in direct competition
with another club for a player.
We thus posit a market where clubs can decide which players to approach. In
actual fact, this may involve complicated forms of multilateral negotiations, but 
for simplicity we model it as the clubs simultaneously making take-it-or-leave-it
4This approach leads to di¢ culties with the interpretation of Nash equilibrium and/or conjec-
tural variations, as the protracted debate (originally kicked o¤ by Szymanski and Késenne, 2004)
in the Journal of Sport Economics illustrates.
5Alternatively, a club could unilaterally decide how much to spend on players (see, for example,
Madden, 2015a). However, it is unclear how such a game could be implemented in the absence of
an invisible hand, and as we will see positing a micro-structure for the market is important.
6In a (theoretical) two-team league, one could say that if the supply of talent is low then the
player will go with the rival, while otherwise they will be unemployed (see Madden, 2011, for a
continuous version of this scheme). However, this approach clearly breaks down if there are more
than two clubs in the league.
3
o¤ers to individual players.7 That is, the clubsobject of choice  their strategic
variable is the vector of wage o¤ers (bids) they make. In a Nash equilibrium then
each clubs vector of bids is a best response to the other clubsbids (and to the
playersacceptance strategies).
The nature of equilibria is determined by the clubsendogenous demand func-
tions for talent: how much a club values an extra unit of talent depends not just
on its own talent level but also on the distribution and the aggregate level of talent
across clubs, at which we wish to evaluate this marginal value. In addition, when
considering to hire an additional player given the other8 clubs (equilibrium) bids
 there are two options: the new player could either be attracted away from the
rival club in the case of contested players, who receive an acceptable o¤er from
the other club; or she could be hired from the pool of non-employed talent in the
case of uncontested players, for whom the other club does not bid.9
Assuming that players are innitesimal and identical, our rst result is to show
that in any equilibrium all hired players must be paid the same wage. This wage
must equal the marginal willingness to pay for players (of both clubs), otherwise
they would have an incentive to hire/poach or let go some players. For uncon-
7This can also be construed as a collection of simultaneous sealed-bid auctions, where the
clubs bid competitively for each individual player. In Burguet and Sákovics (2017), we use the
same bidding model to analyze the competition for inputs among oligopolists. In that paper we
concentrate on the input price and quantity enhancing e¤ects of competitive foreclosure and the
relevance of (non)anonymity, while there are no issues relating to objectives, competitive balance
or revenue sharing. De Fraja and Sákovics (2001) also consider the possibility of competitive
bidding in a decentralized market, but they have a random matching environment, rather than
targeted o¤ers. Palomino and Sákovics (2004) have both targeted bidding and externalities in a
sports context, but they have a single player in each team.
8For claritys sake we set up our framework for a two-team competition. The generalization to
more teams is conceptually straightforward. With more teams, however, additional asymmetric
equilibria may exist, where clubs compete for players with only a subset of the other clubs.
9A similar distinction has often been made in the literature but as exogenous constraints (or
conjectural variations) not as the endogenous consequence of the rivals strategy. For example,
Dobson and Goddard (2011) consider the cases of closed and open player markets separately. In
the former all players are hired and thus contested, by assumption, while in the latter there is an
elastic supply of talent and players are uncontested, again by assumption.
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tested players this must also coincide with their reservation wage: in the absence of
competition, there is no point in paying them more.
Next, we turn to the region of the parameter space (low reservation wage and/or
scarcity of talent) where the marginal willingness to pay (of both clubs) for contested
players exceeds their reservation wage for all talent distributions such that all talent
is hired. We show that an equilibrium with full employment, exclusively comprising
contested players, exists and provide a su¢ cient condition  an upper bound on
the reservation wage for its uniqueness. This equilibrium conrms the Invariance
Principle (initial allocation of talent does not a¤ect the nal, e¢ cient, allocation).
When the equilibrium is not unique, all other equilibria involve involuntary unem-
ployment. When reservation wage is high and/or talent is abundant, we can no
longer have full employment. For illustration, we posit a family of revenue functions
(micro-founded, based on Falconieri et al., 2004), for which we demonstrate the
computation of equilibria.
We also show that when the Invariance Principle applies the sharing of (some
fraction of) the revenues between the clubs simply dampens the incentives to hire
talent, with no e¤ect on its allocation. This does not leave the league without a
motive for intervention: when the clubs bid for the same players, they may compete
too ercely, not just bidding up wages, but even hiring too much talent. As revenue
sharing softens the competition, it can compensate for this tendency.
To retain ease of comparability with the literature, we carry out the above analy-
sis with homogeneous players. This by no means is a necessary simplication. In
Section 6.1 we argue that most of our results directly carry over to a model where
there are a continuum of players with di¤erent talent levels (and di¤erent reserva-
tion wages). Practically all that changes is that wages are interpreted per unit of
talent.
Limits on input usage (a club can only eld the amount of talent that is
embodied in the number of its players that the rules allow to play) also make the
distribution of talent across individual players an important issue. In Section 6.2
we discuss how our model may accommodate the presence of stars, players with
5
a positive measure of talent, when these constraints are taken into account.
Finally, we show that if players prefer to play for one club over the other (for the
same wage) then these compensating di¤erentials can be straightforwardly incorpo-
rated into our analysis, with the Law of One Wage holding for the net payments
received.
We end the paper with some concluding remarks, pointing out the numerous
issues that we have not addressed in our analysis. Many of these may be avenues
for future research based on our model of the market for talent. The proofs of our
results are collected in Appendix A, while Appendix B contains the derivation of
our illustrative parametric revenue function and the analysis of the corresponding
equilibria.
2 Club objectives
We posit a formulation where the clubspreferences are dened over the nal dis-
tribution of talent and in which both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benets are
incorporated. We go beyond the state of the art in the (sub)literature on unifying
the club objectives see Fort (2015) for a detailed retrospective by providing two
new ingredients: i) the opportunity cost of spending money on talent is modelled
endogenously via an indirect utility function; ii) the latter innovation allows for an
endogenous method for deriving the MRS between utility and money as the slope
of the indirect utility function, what in turn leads to the observation that budget
constraints may be ignored in the analysis.10
Since the early days, two competing views have dominated the sports economics
arena. On the one hand, more popular among American scholars, it was postulated
that clubs maximize prots, just as most rms do. On the other hand, starting
with Neale (1964), it has been argued that clubs owned by a benefactoror by
10This latter feature is already present in the formulation by Madden (2015b) where he also does
away with the budget constraint and uses an exogenous generosity parameterto trade o¤ utility
against money. Importantly, he obtains an interior solution as well.
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a large number of memberswho do not receive dividends, as is often the case
with European clubs do not maximize prots. The usual way of modelling these
utility maximizingclubs (c.f. Sloane, 1971) is that they hire all the talent they
can a¤ord. As the optimal behavior according to the rst approach leads to a rst-
order condition, while the second one is determined by a budget constraint, they
often lead to drastically di¤erent conclusions, even in terms of comparative statics.
Let us esh out our argument for a unied club objective by formalizing the
two traditional views on it, together with the one we wish to put forward.11 The
ingredients are: the amount of talent hired by the club, t; the distribution of talent
in a (two-club) league, t = (t1; t2); an exogenous budget (which may include future
income), B; a revenue function, R(t); a cost function, C(t); a utility function mea-
suring the non-pecuniary benets derived from the hired talent, U(t); and a (strictly
increasing) indirect utility function measuring the utility derived from the next-best
use of money, V ($). We assume additive separability of the two utility functions,
and normalize R(0; :) = C(0) = U(0; :) = 0.
The traditional formulations are straightforward:
Prot maximization: maxt [R(t)  C(t)]equivalently,maxt [B +R(t)  C(t)];
F.O.C. : dR(t)
dt




Utility maximization: maxt U(t) s.t. B+R(t) C(t)  0. For any increasing
U(:), the solution requires a binding budget constraint, B +R(t)  C(t) = 0.
We propose a unied formulation, where a clubs objective is the sum of its
non-pecuniary benet from hiring talent, U(t), and of the additional benet that it
achieves by spending its net money holding, B +R(t)  C(t), elsewhere. That is,
Our unied approach: maxt [U(t) + V (B +R(t)  C(t))]; F.O.C. :
dU(t)
dt






11For simplicity, we assume that all the expected revenue can be invested in talent: there are no
credit constraints. This assumption might be relevant for our negative result on the usefulness of


















Looking at (1), note that V 0 measures the marginal utility of an extra unit of
money, and C 0   dR(t)
dt
is the money an extra unit of talent costs the club. At the
optimal choice, the product of these two values must, therefore, equal the marginal
utility from an additional unit of talent.
It is immediate that, since V (:) is increasing, when non-pecuniary e¤ects are
absent U(:)  0 the new formulation leads to the same solution as prot max-
imization. To recover utility maximization, we would need to make tortuous
assumptions on V to recreate the notion of a binding (in both directions) budget
constraint (e.g. that V is zero for non-negative values but it is minus innity for
negative ones).






V 0(B +R(t)  C(t)) = C
0(t): (2)
When the club maximizes prots, the optimal (interior) solution equates the
marginal cost of one more unit of talent to the marginal revenue it brings to the
club. In general, in our unied approach, the optimal solution equates the marginal
cost of one more unit of talent to the marginal increase in the clubsobjectives. The
left-hand side of (2) can be viewed as a modied marginal revenuefunction, one
that includes not only the direct revenue e¤ect of one more unit of talent, but also the
(non-pecuniary) e¤ect on the utility of members/owners, measured in money terms,
where the exchange rate between money and utility is given by V 0(B+R(t) C(t)).
If neither risk aversion nor wealth e¤ects are signicant, the slope of the indirect
12Note that whenever the second-order condition for prot maximization is satised this condi-
tion is also satised for V 00 not too negative. As we argue below, in most cases V 00 is approximately
zero, so we do not tighten the constraint.
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utility function, V 0(:), may be approximated with a constant in the relevant range.13
We will maintain this assumption throughout the rest of the paper. It will allow us
to work with a crisp model of wage determination and talent allocation that focuses
on the interaction between clubs without having to disentangle these interactions
from less informative income e¤ects.
Despite allowing for the objectives of the club to include both utility and prot
considerations, we will continue to refer to the primitive with respect to its own
talent of the left hand side of (2), Z(t) := R(t) + U(t)=V 0, as the revenues.14
Note that, given our formulation of Z(t), not only is there no budget constraint
(V 0 is capturing borrowing costs instead) but there is also no individual rationality
constraint to worry about: Z(t)  C(t) = 0 has no special economic meaning. The
outside opportunities are embodied in the indirect utility function.
Remark 1 There are a couple of observations worth making. First, note that un-
like U(t)+V (B +R(t)  C(t)) our objective function, Z(t), is not a vNM utility
function and neither is the convex combination of revenues and utility derived from
the hired talent. Instead, it is a monetized value, which is not scalable and that
is why it can be compared across clubs. Second, note that the functions R(t) and
U(t)=V 0 are not too di¤erent, after all the clubsrevenues come from the payments
of fans (for tickets, TV channels etc.) whose preferences are much like the own-
ers/members. So both functions depend similarly on total talent level, probability
of winning and competitive balance, with only the weights on these factors perhaps
being di¤erent.
While the club objectives are dened over the distribution of talent, clubs cannot
independently choose their talent level.15 The nal talent allocation is the outcome
of the clubsinteraction in the player market. We turn to that topic next.
13See Friedman and Sákovics (2015) for a detailed motivation and analysis of a similar model in
a consumer choice context.
14Fort (2015) and some of the references therein, also propose a similar functional form, but
without the micro-foundations we provide.
15Mathematically speaking, the clubs cannot independently evaluate dR(t)dt .
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3 A simple model of the player market
On the supply side, we assume that there is a continuum of talent of measure T ,
willing to work for a (reservation) wage of (at least) r. In order to avoid technical
di¢ culties arising from indivisibilities, we treat each innitesimal unit of talent as
a separate entity that is, a playerin our non-cooperative game.16
The demand comes from two competing clubs, whose gross payo¤s are deter-
mined by the nal allocation of acquired talent. In particular, if ti units of talent
are hired by Club i, it earns revenueZi(ti; t3 i), for i = 1; 2.17 Then, the payo¤
functions are Zi(ti; tj)   Ci, where Ci is Club is wage bill (for simplicity, its only
cost). We do not write Ci(ti) not even Ci(ti; tj) for the wage bill, to emphasize
that the cost of hiring ti units of talent is endogenous, even conditional on (ti; tj),
as it depends on the clubsbidding behavior in the player market. To retain the
generality of the analysis and also to keep the focus on the market for talent, we
treat the relationship between talent distribution and revenues as a black box. This
general set-up allows for our results not to be restricted to a specic assumption
(like a contest success function, see Szymanski, 2003) about how the talent distribu-
tion leads to the (composite) revenues. Instead, we can make do with some generic
regularity conditions on the revenue functions Zi.
Next, we describe how the market for talent operates. Each Club i, simultane-
ously, sets a deterministic and Lebesgue measurable wage schedule, Wi(),  2
[0; T ], specifying an individual wage o¤er to each18 player. Players then accept the
highest bid above their reservation wage that they have received if any. As we are
conducting a full game-theoretic analysis, players on the pitch are also players in
our game and as such they have strategies that also form part of the Nash equilibria
16In Section 6.1 we discuss the case where players are heterogeneous, be it in the amount of
talent they possess or in their reservation wage. In Section 6.2 we investigate the consequences of
a player having signicantly more talent than the rest.
17For ease of exposition, we assume that the revenue functions are twice di¤erentiable in both
arguments.
18We require that each player receive an o¤er for mathematical simplicity. If a club wishes not
to make an o¤er to some players, we model it as it o¤ering them a wage below r.
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derived. Most notably, their (possibly mixed) strategy upon receiving two identical
acceptable o¤ers serves as an endogenous rationing device. Importantly, the clubs
are committed to honor all the o¤ers they have made (if accepted).
Take a hypothetical equilibrium, where given the clubswage schedules the re-
sulting distribution of talent is (ti; tj). To conrm the equilibrium, we need to
evaluate whether, holding Club js strategy which is its wage schedule, not the
amount of talent it hires xed, it is in the interest of Club i to change its of-
fers/bids. Considering marginal deviations, we observe that Club is willingness to











. There are two ways Club i can increase its talent
level. If it decides to outbid Club j for a (contested) player then it decreases the
rivals talent level by the same amount it increases its own: dtj
dti
=  1, resulting in
dZi(ti;tj)
dti
= Zi1(ti; tj)  Zi2(ti; tj). If instead it hires an additional uncontested player
that is, one who does not receive an o¤er from Club j, whose wage schedule we
are holding constant , it does not a¤ect the talent level of Club j: dtj
dti
= 0. Thus




The clubschoice between hiring contested or uncontested players is at the heart
of our analysis. By the above discussion, the value of a contested player is Zi2 lower
than that of an uncontested one. Thus, the determinant of a clubs preference is
the sign of Zi2. If the adversarys hiring of an additional unit of talent hurts Club i
(Zi2 < 0) then it will prefer to poach a contested player. On the other hand, if its
revenue increases in the other clubs talent level (Zi2 > 0) then Club i will prefer to
go after an uncontested player (assuming Zi1(ti; tj)  r, of course). The sign of Zi2
is determined by the relative strength of the three factors that a¤ect revenue: total
talent level, sporting performance and competitive balance. The rst of these pushes
Zi2 up, the second pulls it down, while the direction of the third e¤ect depends on
the talent distribution at which we evaluate Zi2. At the level of generality of this




4.1 The law of one wage
We now turn to the analysis of the model. Our rst result shows that despite the
exibility that our mechanism o¤ers clubs to wage discriminate, in equilibrium not
only does each club pay the same wage to all of its players,19 but the wages paid by
the two clubs equalize as well. Note that we need no additional assumptions on the
revenue functions for this result to hold.
Lemma 1 In any Nash equilibrium all hired players are paid the same wage.
An intuitive way of grasping this remarkable result is to note that each club
must be willing to make the same o¤er to each player it is competitively bidding for,
as the maximization problem, given the expected outcome in the competition for
the other players, is the same. Also, competition equalizes the o¤ers made to each
contested player (otherwise the club o¤ering more would benet from lowering its
wage). Next, note that, in equilibrium, any uncontested player who is hired must
be paid r there is no point in o¤ering a higher wage if there is no competing o¤er.
Finally, observe that if any uncontested player is hired, the wage o¤ered to any
(hired) contested players must also be r. Indeed, no club will pay a wage above r
to a contested player, at the same time letting another player go uncontested to the
competitor for a wage of r. We collect these insights in a more nuanced corollary to
Lemma 1.
Corollary 1 In any Nash equilibrium,
i. If any uncontested players are hired, the common wage is r.
ii. If only uncontested players are hired but not all players are hired, then the mar-
ginal willingness to pay for an uncontested player must equal r for both clubs:
19This is due to all players being identical. In general, the interpretation is that the wage per
unit of talent is equalized at least for contested players (c.f. Section 6.1).
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Z11(t1; t2) = Z
2
1(t2; t1) = r. (If there is full employment, the marginal willing-
nesses to pay need not equal either each other or r.)
iii. If any contested players are hired, the wage must equal both clubsmarginal will-
ingness to pay for a contested player: w = Z11(t1; t2) Z12(t1; t2) = Z21(t2; t1) 
Z22(t2; t1)  r.
4.2 Equilibria
We split the analysis of the equilibria of our model into two parts. The reason for
this is two-fold: rst, this way we can directly compare them with existing results;
second, the complexity of the analysis is qualitatively di¤erent in the two cases.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
By Lemma 1 we can see that despite the complex strategies available to the clubs,
the marginal willingness to pay functions described in Section 3 can be usefully
thought of as the clubs(inverse) demands for any constant equilibrium wage. As
is standard, we require that this demand function be downward sloping.20
Assumption 1 Zi1(ti; T   ti)   Zi2(ti; T   ti) is strictly decreasing in ti for all ti;
i = 1; 2.
In words, when all talent is hired, the incentive to poach a player from the rival
is decreasing in the amount of talent the club already has.
Remark 2 In practice it is likely that for small ti marginal revenue is actually
increasing (an issue rst pointed out in Madden, 2010): when ti is small (and all
20Our revenue function is a more complex object than usual, consisting of both a monetary
(R) and a non-monetary (U=V 0) part. For their sum to be concave in ti, a su¢ cient condition is
that both of these functions are concave in ti. As the utility function is concave, we are back to
requiring concavity of the monetary revenues.
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talent is employed) competitive balance is low, so the pie to divide is small, so 
as the e¤ect of an extra unit of talent on the winning probability is also small 
the combined e¤ect is small and therefore smaller than when competitive balance is
high (this argument can be formalized using explicit contest success functions). A
non-monotonic marginal revenue function leads to a residual demand function with
jumps. This is because for any given price the demand is always on the marginal
revenue function but when there are multiple talent distributions leading to the same
MR, there is one of them selected (the one maximizing revenue minus cost). Thus,
in the likely case that the MR curve is single-peaked, we would have a minimum
viable scale(MVS), given by the talent level where average revenue equals marginal
revenue. Note that taking into account xed costs (that we have assumed away) a
MVS would also arise naturally. For simplicity and following the literature we
do not incorporate these constraints into our model (we assume MV S = 0), as it
would not a¤ect our main conclusions.
Finally, to facilitate a formal existence proof, we also impose a common sense
assumption about the range of the demand function:
Assumption 2 21 Zi1(0; T )  Zi2(0; T ) > r  Zi1(T; 0)  Zi2(T; 0); i = 1; 2.
Here the rst inequality states that, at the maximum of the demand function,
willingness to pay exceeds the playersreservation wage, a condition that guarantees
that the market may operate  that is, there are gains from trade. The second
inequality is the ip side: one team cannot earn benets from hiring an additional
player when the other barely participates.
Next, we calculate the hypothetical market clearing wage  and the corre-
sponding talent distribution when all players are contested.22 Thus, we let t be
21In line with Remark 2, we could replace the zeros with the minimum viable scale (and the T s
with T  MV S).
22There is no claim of equilibrium behavior here. The parameters we calculate should be thought
of as primitives of the model.
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the solution to
Z11(t; T   t)  Z12(t; T   t) = Z21(T   t; t)  Z22(T   t; t); (3)
and let
w = Z11(t
; T   t)  Z12(t; T   t): (4)
By Assumptions 1 and 2, these values are uniquely dened. Note that (t; T   t)
is also the allocation that would result if the league maximizing the sum of the
clubsrevenues would choose how to allocate talent across the teams.23 As it turns
out whether w exceeds r or not,24 makes an enormous di¤erence not only to the
equilibrium set but even to the techniques necessary to characterize it. Let us start
with the easier case, which is also the one that is more similar to the existing
literature.
4.2.2 w  r
This is the situation that can lead to the outcomes that are often put forward in
the literature, ever since El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971).
Proposition 1 When w  r, there exists a unique full-employment equilibrium
outcome, with a uniform wage of w and the league-optimal allocation of talent:
t1 = t
, t2 = T   t.
While this is a well-known result,25 we derive it here as a Nash equilibrium of
a non-cooperative game, where the clubs can choose which players to bid for. We
23To see this, note that the leagues rst-order condition is
dZ(t; T   t)
dt
=
dZ1(t; T   t) + Z2(T   t; t)
dt
=
= Z11 (t; T   t)  Z12 (t; T   t) + Z22 (T   t; t)  Z12 (T   t; t) = 0;
what is equivalent to (3).
24For any given revenue functions, this depends on the relative sizes of T and r. Low supply
leads to high market-clearing wage.
25Whitney (2005) challenges this result on two counts. First, he correctly points out that
the league-optimal talent allocation does not obtain if clubs hire exclusively uncontested players
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also explicitly incorporate the e¤ects of hiring contested players into the marginal
revenue functions and therefore into willingness to pay. Moreover, we characterize
the rest of the possible equilibria (when they exist) and provide a su¢ cient condition
for this, focal equilibrium to be unique. In Section 6.1 we further argue that the
result extends to heterogeneous players.
In this equilibrium both clubs o¤er the equilibrium wage equalling their mar-
ginal revenue to all the players and the players accept each clubs o¤er with the
probability corresponding to the equilibrium proportion of talent hired by that club,
ti=T .26 As all the players that are hired are contested, each club knows that if it
lets a player go, this player will end up playing for the other team. It is as if there
was a technological constraint requiring that trades can only happen between clubs.
Thus, we have veried the insight of Rottenberg/Coase:
Corollary 2 When w  r,27 the nal allocation of talent (in the full-employment
equilibrium) will be the same as if clubs started with an arbitrary initial allocation
of players, but they were allowed to frictionlessly trade among themselves.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome cannot be guaranteed without further
assumptions on the revenue functions. w  r only guarantees (existence and)
uniqueness among full-employment equilibria. While it is tempting to think that
(in his case by assumption). What we show here is that the clubs will choose not to engage
with uncontested players, as long as the aggregate talent available (T ) is su¢ ciently low so that
w > r. Whitney also claims that if the market worked in two stages rst the teams bought
(uncontested) players on the open market and then they engaged in bilateral trades ine¢ ciency
would necessarily result. We believe that this is because of his (implicit) assumption that the clubs
do not anticipate the second stage when they hire talent in the rst.
26Alternatively, di¤erent players could accept o¤ers from di¤erent clubs, in a way that the
aggregate measures of acceptance are ti=T .
27Note that w  r is only a su¢ cient condition. The only scenario where the equivalence breaks
down is where there are uncontested players hired in equilibrium. For that to happen, we must
have that the marginal benet of hiring an unemployed player is higher than attracting one away
from the rival. That is, the concerns about aggregate revenue must outweigh the concerns about
performance on the pitch. For example, when the revenues are shared in a non-performance-related
manner. See Section 5.
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the condition does imply at least that, sincethe aggregate demand for contested
players (weakly) exceeds supply, there is no opportunity to hire any uncontested
player (Club i cannot prevent Club j from bidding for a player Club i would like to
have an exclusive deal with), this argument only holds when the clubs make a serious
o¤er to every player and thus full employment is guaranteed, see below. In general,
we cannot draw conclusions about the behavior of the demand functions when there
is no full employment from their behavior under full employment (e.g. Z1(t1; t2)
can be very di¤erent from Z1(t1; t2=2)). Indeed, even with w  r, equilibria can
exist where some uncontested players are hired (and, therefore, by Corollary 1, the
common wage is r = Z11(t1; t2) = Z
2
1(t2; t1)).
Let us now consider the possibility that some players are (involuntarily) unem-
ployed.28 These players would be happy to accept the market wage, but they are
not approached by either club. This can happen in our model as, due to the person-
alized nature of o¤ers, the clubs can choose to approach the same subset of players
(in equilibrium). Indeed, equilibria can exist where the two clubs hire t1 + t2 < T
(contested) players and the common wage paid to the hired (contested) players is
given by
w(t1; t2) = Z
1
1(t1; t2)  Z12(t1; t2) = Z21(t2; t1)  Z22(t2; t1): (5)
Moreover, in addition to not all players being employed, some equilibria may exhibit
both contested and uncontested hires. Of course, unemployment can only be part
of equilibrium if no one is interested in hiring some of the uncontested players:
4.2.3 Full employment
In order to present a su¢ cient condition that ensures that there exists no unemploy-
ment in equilibrium, let us dene the highest wage at which there is always (that
is, at any distribution of talent) demand for an uncontested player by at least one
club.
28Not getting hired by either club need not mean that the player is literally unemployed. For
example, a basketball player not hired in the NBA might play in Europe (or a lower league, say,
ABA 2000). Nonetheless, for ease of exposition we will label them as unemployed.
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Denition 1 Let bw = minft1;t2g[maxfZ11(t1; t2); Z21(t2; t1)g] subject to t1 + t2  T .
With this denition in hand, the following lemma is immediate, as when bw > r
at least one club would want to hire at wage r an unemployed player if there is one.
Lemma 2 When bw > r, there can be no unemployment in equilibrium.
When w  r, we have already argued that with full employment no uncontested
players will be hired. This leads to our uniqueness result:
Corollary 3 When bw > r and w  r, the equilibrium outcome of Proposition 1 is
unique.
Note that generally bw > 0 and w > 0, and there are always positive reservation
wages that allow the Corollary 3 conclusion. Following the next section, we present a
numerical example that shows that whether bw > wand therefore, whether bw > r
or w > r is the su¢ cient condition for uniqueness of the Proposition 1 outcome 
(ceteris paribus) depends on the level of asymmetry between the teams.
4.2.4 w < r
When the reservation wage exceeds w, an equilibrium where all the players are
contested (and thus hired) is no longer possible, since by Assumption 1 at such
r at least one club would prefer not to contest some players. This observation
shows that  similarly to the case where bw < r  w and both contested and
uncontested players are hired in equilibrium the analysis becomes more complex
as the interplay between contested and uncontested o¤ers make the problem multi-
dimensional. The situation is simplest when bw > w. Then, by Lemma 2, in the
region r 2 (w; bw) any equilibria must be of the form of splitting the player market
between the clubs. Given full employment and not all players being contested, by
Corollary 1, any equilibrium will exhibit a wage of r. It is the particular form of the
Zi, what determines the mix of contested and uncontested players hired.
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When r > maxfw; bwg, only under somewhat unrealistic revenue functions can
we retain full employment (with uncontested players) in equilibrium.29 The rest of
possible equilibria are similar to what we have seen above, but always with unem-
ployment. We can have only contested players being hired for a wage satisfying
(5). We can have only uncontested players hired for wage r. Finally, it may be
also that some hired talent is contested and some is not. This requires that all
players are hired at the wage r, from Corollary 1. There are two possible types of
these equilibria. First, it may be that a club hires only contested players and the
other only uncontested players. This would correspond to a situation where one
club benets from a larger talent pool of the competitor due to the increase in
competitive balance outweighing the lower probability of winning , whereas the
other club su¤ers a negative externality from a higher pool of the rival. That is, Zi2
is positive for a club and negative for the other. Second, it may be that both clubs
hire both contested and uncontested players. This corresponds to a rare situation
where there is a talent distribution such that both the pros and cons of poaching
as opposed to hiring uncontested workers exactly compensate for both clubs: Zi2 is
zero for both clubs in equilibrium. Moreover, in this case an equivalent (i.e., with
the same talent allocation and payo¤s) equilibrium always exists where both clubs
hire only contested players: both clubs send o¤ers to all hired players and these
accept according to the distribution of talent in the original equlibrium.
4.2.5 Example
We now present an exemplary revenue function to illustrate our results. This (para-
metric) example incorporates all three revenue generating motives mentioned before.
Thus, it may also serve as a workhorse model to discuss issues regarding the rel-
ative strength of these motives. In Appendix B we provide some justication for
the choice of the functional form and parameters and show that this revenue func-
tion satises our assumptions. We also display the arguments sustaining our claims
29Basically, we would need that the talent distributions for which maxfZ11 (t1; t2); Z21 (t2; t1)g < r
are not the ones near full employment, implying that the willingness to pay is sometimes increasing
in the talent already hired.
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about the equilibrium set.
The revenue function we propose is





; i = 1; 2 with  2 (0; :5).
Here, mi is a parameter capturing the possible asymmetries between clubs, like fan
drawing powers.
Before turning to a full analysis with a symmetric objective function, let us
present an illustration that shows how di¤ering drawing powers a¤ect the equilib-
rium (and its uniqueness) displayed in Proposition 1. Normalizing at T = 1, we have
Club is marginal revenue Zi1(ti; T ti) Zi2(ti; T ti) = mi (1  ti) 1 (1  ti(1 + )).
Equating the two clubs marginal revenues,
m1 (1  t1) 1 (1  t1(1 + )) = m2t 11 (t1(1 + )  ) ;
we can obtain numerically the full-employment equilibrium wage, w, and the
corresponding talent distribution, (t1; 1 t1). Finally, noting thatmaxfZ11(t1; t2); Z21(t2; t1)g




1 g reaches its minimum in t1 where the two curves cross, we can obtain




1= , where  =
1
1+
. In Table 1 we have
calculated the values for  = :4 and a sample of di¤erent asymmetries.
m2=m1 t1 w
 bw
1 :5 :4547m1 :3789m1
2=3 :5567 :3594m1 :3049m1
:5 :5918 :2935m1 :2568m1
1=3 :6309 :2124m1 :1969m1
:1 :6893 :0706m1 :0781m1
Table 1
For simplicity, in the rest of this section we assume symmetry of the clubs:
m1 = m2 = 1.
20
In Appendix B we argue that m1 = m2 implies that all equilibria must be
symmetric. Thus, to calculate w we substitute t1 = :5 into Z11(t1; 1 t1) Z12(t1; 1 
t1) = (1  t1) 1 (1  (1 + )t1) to obtain w = :5(1   ). We also show thatbw = Z11(:5; :5) = :5+1 < :5(1   ) = w. We also note that Z2(t; t) < 0 for all t,
and so we do not have equilibria with uncontested players being hired.
We may compute now the symmetric equilibrium with lowest wage (and thus
maximum equilibrium talent display) for di¤erent parameters.
i. If and only if r  w = :5(1 ) (' :4547, when  = :4), there exists a symmetric
equilibrium with wage w, full employment and all players contested. Any
other equilibrium has a higher wage (and perhaps lower aggregate hired talent).
If r  :5+1, (' :3789, when  = :4) this equilibrium outcome is unique.
ii If r > w, then we cannot have an equilibrium with full employment. The lowest
wage that is consistent with equilibrium (and with the highest level of talent
employed) is r. In fact, there exists an equilibrium where both clubs send





1  , and half of these players
accept each of the clubso¤ers.
5 Revenue sharing
There are a host of interventions a league can employ in order to increase its fan
appeal (or simply aggregate prots). Our model of the player market can be used to
evaluate the consequences of these. Due to space constraints, we content ourselves
with showcasing only one of these, but perhaps the most controversial one.
One of the most debated questions with regard to the player market (c.f. Fort and
Quirk, 1995) is whether teams with high revenues should be forced to share them
with poorer teams presumably  in order to increase the overall quality of the
league (due to competitive balance considerations). The resolution of the problem
of optimal revenue sharing could also help in determining whether imposing the
collective sale of TV rights a procedure which makes redistribution much more
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practical is a good idea.30 We cannot provide a full answer in this paper, but we
wish to highlight a few implications of our approach.
Let us denote the net revenues accrued to Club i after revenue sharing by Si,
and consider a simple revenue sharing scheme, where a proportion 1    of each
clubs (monetary) revenues is transferred to the rival.31 That is, taking into account
non-pecuniary and therefore non-transferable benets:
S1(t1; t2; ) =
U1(t1; t2)
V 01
+ R1(t1; t2) + (1  )R2(t2; t1); (6)
S2(t2; t1; ) =
U2(t2; t1)
V 02
+ R2(t2; t1) + (1  )R1(t1; t2):
Note that  = 1 corresponds to no revenue sharing, while at the other extreme,
 = 1=2 captures full sharing of the (expropriable) revenues. We may dene the
analogue of w when these are the new revenuefunctions, as
w() = S11(t

1; T   t1; )  S12(t1; T   t1; ) = (7)
S21(T   t1; t1; )  S22(T   t1; t1; ):
We can now apply Proposition 1 to generalize the irrelevance result of Fort and
Quirk (1995):
Proposition 2 As long as w()  r and everyone is hired, revenue sharing has









When all talent is hired, the only e¤ect of revenue sharing is to redistribute
revenue from players to clubs. That revenue sharing does not a¤ect the allocation
of talent follows from the combined e¤ect of two facts. One is that it is the marginal
revenues being equal that denes equilibrium.32 The other is that in equilibrium all
30See Falconieri et al. (2004).
31Note that setting  = 1   2 this is equivalent to the clubs sharing a fraction  of the total
revenue equally.
32The reason why it has been claimed that the irrelevance result does not hold with utility
maximizing clubs is that in those models demand is not determined by marginal revenue, but
average revenue. With average revenues the e¤ects of a transfer would not be equal on both teams
demand functions as R
i
ti
6=  Ritj . See below.
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players are contested, implying that the marginal increase of one clubs talent level




d2S1(t1; T   t1)
ddt1
=
dR1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
  dR
2(t2; T   t2)
dt1
(8)
= R11(t1; T   t1) R12(t1; T   t1) R22(t2; T   t2) +R21(t2; T   t2)
=  dR
1(t1; T   t1)
dt2
+
dR2(t2; T   t2)
dt2
=
d2S2(t2; T   t2)
ddt2
:
Thus, the transferred revenue has exactly the same (negative) e¤ect on the
marginal revenues of both the giving and the receiving team. Therefore, if the
marginal revenues were equal to start with for a given talent distribution, they will
continue to be so following redistribution and thus the same talent distribution still
arises in equilibrium after the transfer.
As the clubsincentives to win and thus their willingness to pay for talent 
are unambiguously reduced by revenue-sharing, wages are the lower the fuller the
revenue sharing arrangement is.
When not all talent is hired in equilibrium, revenue sharing may a¤ect competi-
tive balance, in conjunction with a normally negative33 change in the aggregate
amount of talent hired by the league. When supply is elastic, the same forces that
drive willingness to pay down with xed supply are still operational and, as a result,
the overall amount of talent hired in equilibrium normally decreases with revenue
sharing. However, competitive balance might increase or decrease, depending on the
specications of the revenue functions. Therefore, while it often does, revenue shar-
ing does not necessarily reduce the qualityof the league, as the e¤ect of revenue
sharing on competitive balance may compensate for the lower aggregate talent level.
33When the amount of talent that one club hires changes, this also changes the other clubs




Up to now, we have assumed that talent is the unit of measure, that all talent has
the same reservation wage, and that all that matters for clubsrevenues is how many
units of that measure they hire. There are two ways in which player heterogeneity
can a¤ect the market outcome. The rst has to do with the way the market operates:
players, and not units of talent, are the recipients of o¤ers. Consequently, with
heterogeneous players the targeting of o¤ers becomes even more relevant, while
the calculation of marginal revenue is also altered. The second channel a¤ects the
clubsvaluations, as they may depend not only on the total amount, but also on the
composition of the talent hired. We will have a brief look at both of these added
complexities in turn. Our third extension relates to the heterogeneity of clubs. While
we have allowed for arbitrary asymmetries in their objective functions, we have not
considered the possibility that players have preferences over the clubs ceteris paribus.
When compensating di¤erentials exist, our analysis has to be adjusted. As it turns
out, the adjustment is straightforward and does not alter our results.
6.1 Only aggregate talent matters
Let T continue to be the measure of both the players and their aggregate talent, but
let f(x), for x 2 [0; T ], be the measure (density) of the talent Player x has. Thus,R T
0
f(x)dx = T and our baseline model corresponds to the case where all players
have one unit of talent: f(x)  1.34 We assume without loss of generality that
f(x) is weakly decreasing in x.
We now show that our main results carry over to this scenario if we normalize
prices/valuations so that the discussion is about values per unit of talent (PUT).
Note that with heterogeneity, what matters is the marginal e¤ect on supply and
demand of hiring an additional player (which is no longer the same as an additional
unit of talent). Thus, we do not di¤erentiate the revenue function with respect to
talent, t, but with respect to the number/measure of players, n. As the clubs will
34We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.
24
hire players in decreasing order of talent,35 the aggregate talent level is t1 + t2 =R x0
0















= f(x0)Zi1(ti; tj); j 6= i = 1; 2;
since dtj
dni



















Zi1(ti; tj)  Zi2(ti; tj)

; j 6= i = 1; 2;





= f(x00) and that dnj
dni
=  1. Therefore,
(3) will be unchanged except that we need to interpret Zi1(ti; tj) Zi2(ti; tj) as the
willingness to pay PUT , and (4) also continues to hold if we reinterpret w as
the PUT wage that clears the market. By also transforming a players reservation
wage into PUT form,37 we can directly generalize our main proposition to this
environment.38
Proposition 3 (1) When w  r=f(T ), there exists a unique full-employment
equilibrium outcome, with a uniform PUT wage of w and the league-optimal allo-
cation of talent: t1 = t, t2 = T   t. When bw  r=f(T ) this equilibrium outcome
is unique.
Observing that (7) also carries over with the PUT interpretation, it is straight-
forward to check that Proposition 2 also generalizes.
Proposition 4 (2) As long as w()  r=f(T ) and everyone is hired, revenue
sharing has no e¤ect on the talent distribution, while it decreases the market wage








35Recall that the we are assuming that reservation wage is independent of the talent level. This
assumption is not necessary. It would be su¢ cient to have that r(x)=f(x) is increasing in x, given
that f(x) is assumed decreasing in x.
36Note that a clubs willingness to pay PUT is the same as before for all contested players, so
the identity of x00 is irrelevant.
37Note that, as the reservation wage PUT is decreasing in x, we need it to be no less than the
equilibrium wage for the highest x, that is T .
38Note that bw remains unchanged (though reinterpreted as PUT) as well, c.f. Denition 1.
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In general, all contested players will always receive the same PUT wage, equal to
the reservation PUT wage of the marginal contested player. However, it is possible
that in equilibrium some uncontested players may also be hired. As before, that
will require that they are paid their own reservation wages. In order for this to be
compatible with equilibrium, it is necessary that the PUT wage of hired uncontested
players is no lower than that of the (common) PUT wage of contested players.
Indeed, otherwise a rival club would prefer to contest a previously uncontested
player hired by the club and instead let the club get previously contested players
uncontested. That is, equilibrium behavior also requires that rms compete for
the players who would accept the lowest o¤ers. In addition such mixed hiring will
also require that a club hiring uncontested players has no incentive to poach the
rival (instead). That is, that Zi2 is positive for that club at the equilibrium talent
distribution.
6.2 Team composition matters
In order to simplify the analysis, we have assumed that the revenues of each club were
a function (only) of their total talent (and that of their rivals). Our baseline model
works well when talent is evenly distributed across (relevant) players. Indeed, in
that case, discussing wages in terms of talent instead of in terms of players is simply
a shortcut that allows us to use the rst-order approach. Only vexing integer-issues
are added, if we consider the discrete nature of the packs of talent.
In team sports, though, it is not only the aggregate talent level of a club that
matters for performance, but also its distribution among individual players. Indeed,
one of the most salient phenomena that characterize sports is the relevance of big
stars for the outcome (not to talk about fan appeal, c.f. Buraimo and Simmons,
2015): Michael Jordans are very exceptional even if we only consider players in
top teams in the NBA. This exceptionality is relevant because only ve players
may be on court at any point during a match: if rival teams could simultaneously
eld ten players who together incorporated Jordans talent (and who would cost
approximately what Jordan costs), that exceptionality would be of no relevance to
26
our analysis.
We may generalize our model to discuss specic issues that the existence of stars
raise in sports.39 One of these issues is whether we should expect a stars wages be
simply proportional to the number of e¢ ciency units of talent (s)he possesses.
To take into account, among other nuances, the relevance of stars once not all
the talent can be elded simultaneously, let us generalize our baseline model by
supposing that every player, n, is characterized by an amount of talent f(n), and
the aggregate talent a club elds on the pitch is a function of the vector of talent
ti = (f(n1); f(n2); :::; f(nNi)) embodied in the set of players Ni hired by club i:
(ti). This function takes into account the intensity with which the player may be
used in the competition. Stars, with large values of f(n) will play regularly, whereas
players with relatively low value of f(n) will be used mainly as substitutes. The
revenues of a club then depend on the weighted amounts of talent,
Zi ((ti); (tj)) :
Our baseline model is a special case of this formulation where the talent levels are
simply added up: (ti) =
P
j2Ni f(nj).
Now, suppose that there is only one star, with a discrete amount of talent,  ,
whereas there is a continuum of normalplayers with identical and small amount
of talent, that we treat as innitesimal (just as in our baseline model). Thus, let
 (t) denote the normal talent that a club with the star and normal talent t can
put on the eld, and let  (t)+  be the total talent that this club puts on the eld.
Also, let 0(t) denote the talent that the club without the star can eld. Naturally,
if the teams are assumed ex ante similar (same Z), we expect in equilibrium that
 (t) +  > 0(t) >  (t). In other words, the team with the star is stronger than
the team without, but the teammates of the star together put less talent on the
pitch than the starless team. Also, both functions should be increasing in t. To
simplify the discussion, we model competition for talent sequentially, so that clubs
compete simultaneously bidding for the star rst, and then, after the star has signed
39See Rosen (1981) for the pioneering work on this topic.
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with a club, they compete for normal talent as in our baseline model.40
The amounts of normal talent hired by the clubs in the second stage are given by
(rst-order) conditions similar to the ones we have obtained before. For example,
suppose that there is a total of T normal talent. Also, dene t for this case as the
solution in t to
Z1 ( (t) +  ; 0(T   t))0 (t)  Z2 ( (t) +  ; 0(T   t))00(T   t) (9)
= Z1 (0(T   t);  (t) + )00(T   t)  Z2 (0(T   t);  (t) + )0 (t);
where 0i(:) represents the derivative of i. Finally, denote the corresponding value
of either side of the above equation by w. The following lemma is then a straight-
forward corollary of Proposition 1 and the fact that in the auction for the star the
winning club will have to pay the di¤erence between the continuation payo¤ with
or without the star.
Lemma 3 If the clubs are ex ante identical, both teams bid the same for the star
player and she plays for either team with equal probability. If, moreover, w > r,
then, (assuming, without loss of generality, that Club 1 signs the star) the distribu-
tion of normal talent is (t; T   t) and the wage is w. The equilibrium condition
determining the stars wage is
ws = Z ( (t
) +  ; 0(T   t))  Z (0(T   t);  (t) + )  w(2t   T ): (10)
Having characterized the equilibrium, we may ask questions as, for instance,
whether there is a superstarbias in the wage of these sport stars. The answer
may depend on the functional forms of Z(:) and (:), but we should expect that at
the solution to (9), 2t T < 0. In words, mantaining that both clubs are otherwise
symmetric i.e., have the same revenue function , the team without the star hires
more normal talent in equilibrium.41 Then, according to (10), the star is paid above
her marginal revenue product: ws is above the di¤erence in revenues that having
40See Palomino and Sákovics (2004) for a similar sequential auction.
41This would clearly happen when the (:) are linear, as in that case the nal talent allocations
would be equal between the two clubs.
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the star brings to the club (as it also brings on a reduction in the wage bill for the
normal talent).42
The analysis of this sort of biases or the e¢ ciency of talent distribution for par-
ticular forms of Z(:) and (:) may then be accommodated in our general framework.
Although that analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper, we believe that the
modeling tools that we have developed here o¤er an appropriate workhorse model
for this task.
6.3 Compensating di¤erentials
In the above analysis, we have taken for granted that contested players accept the
highest wage o¤er. In practice, the situation is more complicated. As di¤erent
teams tend not to be in the same location, playing for one club may lead to di¤erent
amenity values and/or local price/tax levels and/or chances of sporting success
than playing for the other.43 As a result, players may accept the lower of two
competing wages if the compensating di¤erential outstrips the wage di¤erence. We
can incorporate this to our model by assuming that Club 1 has an advantage of y
over Club 2 and that the reservation wage r is dened for Club 1 (and thus the
reservation wage at Club 2 is r + y).44 This di¤erence is also present for contested
players: wage competition will lead the clubs to make o¤ers that lead players to
be indi¤erent between them. This also has an e¤ect on the equilibrium talent
distribution as now marginal willingnesses to pay do not equalize, Club 2 has to
pay more to make it competitive, so it has to have a higher equilibrium marginal
willingness to pay. To illustrate: equations (3) and (4) become
Z11(t; T   t)  Z12(t; T   t) + y = Z21(T   t; t)  Z22(T   t; t);
42This could have an exacerbating e¤ect on the negative externalities that some teams obsessively
seeking a league championship can have on the rest (c.f. Whitney, 1993).
43We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.






; T   t)  Z12(t; T   t);
w2 = Z
2
1(T   t; t)  Z22(T   t; t) = w1 + y:
The way to reconcile this with the Law of One Wage is that the net wage is
common even if the gross wages are di¤erent.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a new modelling framework for the analysis of labor markets in
professional sports. A major advantage of our set-up is that it allows for a proper
game-theoretic analysis. A number of our ndings have concurred with previously
existing results, now basing them on a realistic micro-structure and Nash behavior.
There are several considerations that we have not addressed, despite their im-
portance. They should provide topics for extending our work. Let us enumerate the
most important avenues here:
1. The result that the initial allocation of talent does not matter (Corollary 2)
crucially depends on the Coasian nature of bargaining. If there are frictions,
like switching costs or asymmetric information, then they introduce a wedge
which needs careful analysis (c.f. Burguet et al., 2002).
2. We have also assumed that the players are free agents. If they were not, the
club holding their contract could extract surplus from the poaching club by
charging a transfer fee. This situation is qualitatively similar to the one where
players have a preference over which club to play for as the poaching club
needs to pay extra.
3. Our model and analysis  as the vast majority of the literature  is static
(except for the star player model). Dynamic approaches, taking into account
the evolution of talent distribution, like Grossman et al. (2010), can further
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add to our understanding. Similarly, the length of contract also may be a
factor (c.f. Buraimo et al., 2015).
4. By assuming that the clubs could use their future revenues for hiring today, we
have also abstracted away from credit market imperfections and asymmetries.
To the extent that revenue sharing improves competitive balance in practice,
it is likely to operate through the alleviation of those.
5. While our set-up does extend to a league of many teams in a straightforward
manner, not all our results do. With more teams, they may in principle
compete for players in endogenously partitioned submarkets, what may result
in more than one wage paid to contested players.
6. While we have analyzed the consequences of revenue sharing, we have not
identied the optimal rule that a league would impose, neither have we inves-
tigated the e¤ects of other interventions.
7. We have not conducted a welfare analysis either. Even if the league has signif-
icant autonomy, it is of interest to see how the market equilibrium (possibly
modied by league imposed restrictions) performs relative to a social optimum.
The key ingredient here would be the incorporation of consumer surplus into
the welfare function (see, for example, Dietl et al., 2009).
Finally, we have not made an attempt to capture the myriad institutional details
that vary across di¤erent sports and leagues. In fact, we have made an e¤ort to
minimize the specicity of our model. The goal of this paper is to propose a general
approach to modelling the player market that, for transparency, we have presented
in the simplest possible scenario. Our observations are posited based on su¢ cient
conditions, which continue to apply if additional restrictions are imposed.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1:
Proof. First, observe that any uncontested player hired must be paid r in any equi-
librium: in the absence of competition, from any higher o¤er, it would be protable
to deviate and make a lower o¤er that still exceeds r (and thus will be accepted).
If there are also contested players hired in equilibrium these cannot be paid a wage
above r: the rival of a club hiring uncontested players would prot from deviating
and outbidding its rival (by bidding r + ") for some of their originally uncontested
players, while letting the same amount of contested players go to the rival. The
resulting talent distribution would be the same, but the wage bill would be lower.
This proves i..
Next, suppose that only uncontested players are hired, and some players are
not hired (in equilibrium). Assume that for one of the clubs, say 1, their marginal
willingness to pay for an uncontested player Z11(t1; t2) 6= r. If it is higher than r then,
by the continuity of Z11(t1; t2), they would prefer to hire some of the unemployed
players. If it is lower, then by the same argument they would prefer to shed some
of their hired players. Note that in case there are no unemployed players even if a
club would prefer to hire another uncontested player there would not be any. This
proves ii..
Finally, assume that some of the players hired are contested and that for one
of the clubs, say 1, at the equilibrium talent distribution for a positive measure of
players their wages are not equal to Z11(t1; t2) Z12(t1; t2). If the wage is higher, then
by the continuity of Z11(t1+x; t2 x) Z12(t1+x; t2 x) in x, the club would prot
from hiring " less contested players (and thus transferringthem to Club 2). If the
wage is lower then the club would prot from outbidding its rival for " more players.
Thus, if contested players are hired in equilibrium the wage must be common and
equal to the clubsmarginal willingness to pay for contested players. This proves
iii.. The three cases together prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1:
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Proof. Suppose w  r, and suppose that Club 2 o¤ers every player a wage w.
Club 1s best response amounts to choosing howmuch talent t1 to hire at wage w (or
perhaps innitesimally above w) letting the rest of talent T t1 go to the rival. The
optimal choice satises the rst-order condition Z11(t

1; T   t1) Z12(t1; T   t1) = w,
that we already know that has a (unique) solution. As, by Assumption 1, the
left-hand side of this condition is decreasing in t1, that rst order condition is also
su¢ cient, conrming that we indeed have an equilibrium, as long as players accept




, what is a best response for them as they are
indi¤erent.
Suppose now that we have another full-employment equilibrium, with t1 > t.
That implies that not all players are contested, since Z11(t; T   t)   Z12(t; T   t) is
decreasing in t. Therefore, the wage must be r. Also, Z21(T t1; t1) Z22(T t1; t1) >
w > r, since the expression, by Assumption 1, is increasing in t1, which cannot
be equilibrium unless t1 = 0, a contradiction of t1 > t. For t1 < t (and so
T   t1 > T   t) the proof is similar.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Substituting the value of S1 and S2 into (7), we have
1
V 01
dU1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
+ 
dR1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
+ (1  )dR





dU2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
  dR
2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
  (1  )dR






dU1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
+




dU2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
  dR
2(T   t1; t1)
dt1
= w() + (1  )

dR1(t1; T   t1)
dt1
  dR













Z11(t1; T   t1)  Z12(t1; T   t1) = Z21(t1; T   t1)  Z22(t1; T   t1); (13)
for any . This equation is (4), so the equilibrium talent distribution, (t; T   t)
is unchanged by revenue sharing. That is, the rst line of (12) is independent of .
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The last equality in (12) then characterizes the equilibrium wage, w(). Finally
note that, when w > r, dR
1(t1;T t1)
dt1
> 0 and dR
2(T t1;t1)
dt1
< 0, so w() is indeed
increasing.
Appendix B
Here we argue that the revenue function we use in our example depicts a sensible
model of the "downstream market" of sport competition. We do not claim that
it is the best or the only representation, we only suggest it for illustration.
It builds on the micro-founded Cobb-Douglas match value function developed in
Falconieri et al. (2004) for TV viewers and corrects it for the missing factor of
performance related revenue and allows for asymmetry in the size of followers of





with  2 (0; :5).
The restriction on the value of  can be argued straightforwardly. Denote the
total talent employed by E = ti+tj. We can write Zi1(ti; tj) = mi
t+1j
E2






. Now note that the bliss point of this revenue function (in an
equilibrium where all players are contested) is at the talent distribution where Zi1 
Zi2 = 0. Writing ti for tj the equality becomes 
2 =    (1   ). Solving for ,
we obtain  = . As empirical evidence for fans gives bliss values of win percent of
around two thirds (corresponding to  = :5), we would expect an even lower value
to account for performance related revenue that the fans do not internalize.
To see that this revenue function satises our assumptions, note that:




Zi12(ti; tj) = Z
i
21(ti; tj) = mit

j
( + 1)ti   (1  )tj
E3
and
Zi22(ti; tj) = mitit
 2
j
(  1)t2i + (2     2)titj + (  1)(2     2)t2j
E3
:
Assumption 1 is satised if
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0@  2t+1j   2tj (( + 1)ti   (1  )tj) + tit 2j ((  1)t2i+
(2     2)titj + (  1)(2     2)t2j)
1A < 0:
This is equivalent to
 2t+1j +
 
(  1)(2     2)  2( + 1) titj +
tit
 2
j ((  1)t2i + (2     2)titj)
=  2t+1j +
 
3   22   3 titj + tit 2j ((  1)t2i + (2     2)titj)
< 0;
which is satised for all (ti; tj), as each coe¢ cient is negative.
Finally, Assumption 2 is satised as Zi1(0; T )   Zi2(0; T ) = 1 and Zi1(T; 0)  
Zi2(T; 0) = 0.
Next, we o¤er the arguments/computations that sustain the results for the equi-
libria presented in the main text.
Lemma 4 In our symmetric example all equilibria are symmetric and involve only
contested hires.
Proof. We rst observe that equilibria may involve contested hires only (or be
equivalent to that) or one team hiring only contested, and the other only uncontested
players. Indeed, as we discussed in the text, only in knife-edge cases (here it would
require  = :5) may we have symmetric equilibria with both types of hires, and then
an equivalent equilibrium exists with the same wage (r) and talent distribution in
which all players receive two o¤ers. In an asymmetric equilibrium with both types
of hires, we would need that at the equilibrium talent distribution for one team its
contested marginal valuation is higher and for the other its uncontested marginal
valuation is. This would imply that the rst only hires contested players and the
second only hires uncontested players. These require that









We also need (by Corollary 1) that
Z11(t1; t2)  Z12(t1; t2) = Z21(t2; t1):















, the LHS is 1, while the RHS is more than 1 (since  <







derivative of the RHS is positive. Therefore (15) and (16) are incompatible, proving
that the asymmetric equilibrium with both types of hires does not exist in our
example.
Next, note that, by Corollary 1, in an equilibrium with only uncontested players
we must have Z11(t1; t2) = Z
2








, implying that the equilibrium must be symmetric. More-
over, Zi2( ; ) = 
 (2 1)
42
< 0 for  < :5, and so equilibria with only uncontested
hires may not occur with these revenue functions (as the value for the marginal con-
tested player is higher than that of the marginal uncontested one at any symmetric
talent distribution).
Finally, turning to the equilibria with only contested hires, note that, by Corol-
lary 1, we must have Z11(t1; t2)   Z12(t1; t2) = Z21(t2; t1)   Z22(t2; t1). This equation
has only symmetric solutions. Indeed, note that for any E and t2 = t1 = E=2, the
equation is trivially satised. Now, for any  > 0, and from Assumption 1, satised
by our example, the LHS is larger and the RHS smaller at (E=2   ; E=2 + ).
Therefore, and since any distribution of talent may be obtained from some E and
some , the result follows. Thus, we can restrict our attention to equilibria, where
both clubs hire the same amount of contested players, by Lemma 1, making the
same o¤er to all of them.
Now, in search for equilibrium, and without loss of generality, suppose Club 2
makes t o¤ers with wage w  r. We compute the best response for Club 1. That
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is, taking into account that by slightly overbidding the rival Club 1 can choose how




( + )(t  )
t+ 
  w   r (17)
s:t: 0    t
0    1  t;
where  and  are the resulting measure of contested and uncontested players,
respectively, hired by Club 1. The derivatives of the objective function with respect
to  and , respectively, are
(t  ) 1
t+ 




For an equilibrium with only contested players to exist, we need  = 0. When
t = 1, this is true since that is the only point in Club 1s choice set of . When
t < 1, it is necessary that (19) which is decreasing in  is negative at  = 0. We
analyze both cases in turn.
7.0.1 t = 1
Consider (18) with  = 0 and t = 1. We can write the rst order condition for the
optimal  as
(1  ) 1(1  (1 + ))  w = 0:
As  < 1, the LHS is decreasing in  for  2 (0; 1). Thus, the su¢ cient second
order conditions are satised and  there is a unique optimal value of . This
solution is  = :5, if and only if




When this value is above r, this is an equilibrium.
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7.0.2 t < 1
In this case the rst-order condition (with  = 0) can be written as
(t  )(1 + )  t(t  ) 1   tw = 0:
The LHS is still decreasing in , leading to a unique solution. This solution is
 = :5t, only if
w = t 12 (1  ): (20)









(1  ) 11  : (21a)
We also need that the optimal  = 0 given  = :5t. That is, from (19)
:5+1t 1 < r: (22)
Note that the limit of the (decreasing) LHS as t ! 1 is bw. Indeed, there is no
t < 1 for which r  bw is compatible with equilibrium.
We are not done yet. We still need to check for the protability of a global
deviation from (t=2; t=2) and  = 0. Such a deviation would imply  > 0 and
 6= t=2.
Letting x = t  , we can now write (18) as
x(1 + )  (t+ )x 1   (t+ )w;
which is still increasing in x (decreasing in ). Thus, for each  and t, there is
a unique (perhaps corner) solution to the rst-order condition and thus a unique
optimal value of .
When t is as given by (21a), (19) is smaller, for any non-negative (; ), than
t 1   r = w 2

1     r:
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> 1 for  > 0, w = r is su¢ cient.
As we have already considered  = 0, the response involving  = 0 is the only
remaining case to check note that  = t can never be a solution, as then the rival
would have no players, leading to zero payo¤ to both clubs. Then  must either
satisfy (19)= 0 or be 1  t if (19)> 0 at  = 1  t. That means that the optimal 
(with  = 0) is the non-negative solution to
t+1
(t+ )2
  r = 0;
when t+1 < r and 1   t otherwise. Club 1 will prefer not to choose this deviation







 = maxf0;minf1  t; t+12 r 12   tgg:
Let us rst look at the case 1  t  t+12 r 12   t. That is, r  t+1. We need to




2   t when this






































where we have substituted (20) into the second equality. Thus, for equilibrium we
need that
t 12 (+1)  (t 12   r 12 )2: (25)
It is straightforward to show that the inequality is always satised (for   :5) when
w = t 12 (1  ) = r.
When t+1 > r (and so  = 1  t), (23) becomes (1  t) (t   r), and (25) turns
into
t2 (+1)  (1  t) (t   r) : (26)
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Again, it can be shown that when w = t 12 (1  ) = r, the inequality is always
satised. Thus, when t is given by (21a),  = t=2 and  = 0 is indeed an equilibrium
with the lowest wage, w = r.
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